This paper considers a monopolist selling two objects to a single buyer with privately observed valuations. We prove that if each buyer's type has a non-negative virtual valuation for each object, then the optimal price schedule is such that the objects are sold only in a bundle; weaker conditions suffice if valuations are independently and identically distributed. Under somewhat stronger conditions, pure bundling is the optimal sale mechanism among all individually rational and incentive compatible mechanisms.
Introduction
This paper studies the optimal sale mechanism for a monopolist which offers two different objects to a single buyer who privately observes her own valuations for the objects. 1 We provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal (i.e., profit-maximizing) mechanism consists in pure bundling (i.e., selling both objects only in a bundle).
Since Myerson (1981) and Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) , it is well-known that for the setting with a single object the optimal mechanism is such that the seller puts the object on sale at a suitable price, determined by the probability distribution of the buyer's valuation.
However, the setting with two objects is considerably more difficult and Manelli and Vincent (2006 , 2007 , 2012 prove that the form of the optimal mechanism depends on the distribution of the buyer's valuations, unlike in the one-object environment. In some cases the optimal mechanism is characterized by a price schedule which specifies a price for each object and a price for the bundle of the two objects, but in other cases the optimal mechanism assigns the objects randomly. 2 In general, many different mechanisms can be optimal as the distribution of valuations varies, and typically not much is known about the optimal mechanism for a given distribution, except for a few specific settings. For instance, when the valuations are independently and identically distributed, Manelli and Vincent (2006) , Pavlov (2011) , and Giannakopoulos (2014) solve the problem for uniform or exponential distributions; Hart and Nisan (2014) prove that pure bundling is optimal if the density for each valuation decreases quickly. Hart and Nisan (2014) also try to bound from below the fraction of the optimal profit that can be obtained by selling the objects separately (i.e., posting a suitable price for each object, as in two unrelated one-object settings), or by selling them in a bundle. For instance, they show that when valuations are i.i.d., separate sales yield at least 73 percent of the optimal profit. Conversely, when valuations are correlated, separate selling cannot guarantee any positive fraction of the optimal profit. 3 This paper's main contribution consists in providing sufficient conditions which make it optimal to sell the objects as a bundle. Precisely, in Section 3, we assume that the seller 1 We use "she" for the buyer and "he" for the seller. 2 Hart and Reny (2013) prove that the seller's profit in the optimal mechanism may decrease when the buyer's valuations increase in the sense of first order stochastic dominance, another feature which does not arise in one-object setting. 3 Li and Yao (2013) improve some of the lower bounds considered in Hart and Nisan (2014) .
uses price schedules which specify a price for each object and a price for the bundle. In this setting we show that if the virtual valuation for each object is non-negative for each buyer type, then the optimal price schedule is such that each buyer type either buys the bundle, or buys nothing; weaker conditions suffice for this result if the valuations are independently and identically distributed. More precisely, we prove that for any mixed bundling price schedule where some types buy only one of the two objects, it is strictly profitable to reduce the price of the bundle. Such price change induces a fraction of types who buy at most one object to buy the bundle, which increases the profit because the virtual valuation of a single object is positive for any type. This result complements McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989), who prove that selling the objects separately is suboptimal when valuations are independently distributed, as introducing a small discount for the bundle (mixed bundling) increases the profit. Under our sufficient conditions, mixed bundling is dominated by pure bundling.
Our framework can be applied to business-to-business transactions in which a given seller sells its objects to multiple buyers by applying a third-degree price discrimination:
the seller can offer a different price schedule to each different buyer. In this situation, as long as buyers do not compete in the same market, each buyer can be treated as a separate market. The seller should have some precise (albeit imperfect) idea about each business customer's valuations for his objects. For instance, the seller can conduct market studies for this purpose. Our sufficient condition that the virtual valuation is positive for all types is likely to be met for serious buyers whose minimum valuations are high enough. Then, pure bundling is the optimal sale strategy. All other things being equal, pure bundling is more likely to be optimal for objects with lower costs of production implying that when licensing highly-valued patents, pure bundling is likely to be profit-maximizing.
Since mechanisms based on price schedules are only a subset of the set of all individually rational and incentive compatible mechanisms, in Section 4, we consider a setting in which the seller may use any mechanism in the set of individually rational and incentive compatible mechanisms. We give sufficient conditions for pure bundling to be optimal among all mechanisms in this set. These conditions are unrelated to those in Hart and Nisan (2014) , and can in part be interpreted as a strengthening of the condition of non-negative virtual valuations.
The model
A monopolist, henceforth denoted by M, owns two indivisible objects which are worthless to him, 4 and faces a buyer interested in these objects. 5 M wishes to design a mechanism to maximize his expected profit (i.e., revenue) from trading with the buyer. The buyer is risk neutral and privately observes her own valuations for the objects, denoted with v 1 , v 2 . Her payoff from trading with the seller is given by her gross utility minus the payment to M, and her gross utility is v 1 + v 2 if she consumes both objects, is v i if she consumes only object i 
Price schedules
In this section we assume that M offers the objects to the buyer by posting a price schedule (p 1 , p 2 , P ) which specifies a price p i for good i, for i = 1, 2, and a price P for the bundle of the two objects. Without loss of generality we consider (p 1 , p 2 , P ) satisfying
After seeing (p 1 , p 2 , P ), the buyer chooses the alternative which maximizes her own payoff. Notice that for each type of buyer, the buyer's probability to obtain object i, or the bundle, is in {0, 1}. For this reason this mechanism is said to be deterministic.
Let S 1 , S 2 , S 12 denote the set of types who, respectively, buy object 1 only, object 2 only, the bundle. Let μ 1 , μ 2 , μ 12 denote the measure of S 1 , S 2 , S 12 , respectively. In order to derive μ 1 , μ 2 , μ 12 as a function of (p 1 , p 2 , P ), we need to distinguish the case of P ≤ p 1 + p 2 from the case of P > p 1 + p 2 . 6 In this section, we focus on the first case and consider the second case (for which we obtain the same results) in the appendix. 4 Our results extend in a straightforward way to the case in which M has valuations for the objects or incurs production costs. See extensions in Section 3. 5 Alternatively, we can assume that the monopolist sells the two objects to a continuum of buyers. 6 Imposing the inequality P ≤ p 1 + p 2 makes sense if the seller is unable to monitor the buyer's purchases.
That may be the case if the seller faces many anonymous buyers.
Then, M's profit is given by:
A type (v 1 , v 2 ) belongs to S 1 if and only if 7 v 1 ≥ p 1 (i.e., buying only object 1 is better than buying nothing) and v 2 < P − p 1 (i.e., buying only object 1 is better than buying the bundle). 8 Hence
Notice that if p 1 >v 1 and/or p 1 > P − v 2 , then S 1 = ∅ and μ 1 = 0 since for each type, v 1 < p 1 and/or v 2 > P − p 1 . However, π remains unchanged if M lowers p 1 to satisfy
9 Therefore, without loss of generality, we
Likewise, (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ S 2 if and only if v 2 ≥ p 2 and v 1 < P − p 2 . Hence
and we assume without loss of generality that M chooses p 2 such that p 2 ≤ min{v 2 , P −v 1 }.
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Finally, (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ S 12 if and only if Figure 1 (a) below. Hence
We define a mixed bundling schedule and a pure bundling schedule as follows.
Definition 1
We say that (p 1 , p 2 , P ) is a mixed bundling schedule if μ 1 (p 1 , p 2 , P ) > 0 and/or
In particular, (p 1 , p 2 , P ) is a pure bundling schedule if P = min {p 1 + v 2 , p 2 + v 1 }. 7 As a tie-breaking rule we assume that each buyer who is indifferent between two or more alternatives chooses the alternative which maximizes her gross utility. However, since the distribution of types is atomless, how indifferences are broken does not affect the results. 8 These two inequalities, jointly with
Hence buying only object 1 is better than buying only object 2. 9 This reduction of p 1 does not affect neither μ 2 nor μ 12 since, given p 1 ≥ min{v 1 , P − v 2 }, p 1 does not affect any type's preferred alternative among buying only object 2, buying the bundle, and buying nothing. 10 Notice that p 1 ≤v 1 , p 2 ≤v 2 and P ≤ p 1 + p 2 imply P − p 1 ≤v 2 and P − p 2 ≤v 1 .
As a benchmark, consider a single-object monopolist facing a buyer whose valuation for the object has a c.d.f. F and a density f which is continuous and positive in the support
Then it is well known that the profit-maximizing price is either v, or solves the equation
In particular, the optimal price is equal to v if J(x) ≥ 0 for each x ∈ [v,v]. J(x) is often called the "virtual valuation" of type x (Myerson, 1981) and represents the marginal contribution to M's profit made by the sale of the object to a buyer with valuation x, taking into account a negative effect on the payment the seller obtains from each type with valuation greater than x.
In our two-object setting, the virtual valuation for object i of a type
The next proposition establishes that the optimal pricing schedule for M consists in pure bundling when the virtual valuation for each object is non-negative for all types. Let P * denote the optimal pure bundling price, i.e. the solution to the problem of
jointly with p 1 = min{v 1 , P * − v 2 } and p 2 = min{v 2 , P * − v 1 }, is the optimal pricing schedule since each mixed bundling schedule is suboptimal.
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In order to illustrate the main ideas of the proof of Proposition 1, we consider a mixed we show that a small reduction in the price of the bundle from P to P 0 = P − ε (with ε > 0 and small) is profitable. Figure 1 (a) represents the sets S 1 , S 2 , S 12 given the initial mixed bundling schedule. In Figure 1 (b), we consider the reduction in the price of the bundle and partition V into three subsets X, Y, Z such that 11 We specify p 1 = min{v 1 , P * − v 2 } and p 2 = min{v 2 , P * − v 1 } because of the restriction on (p 1 , p 2 ) that we previously imposed without loss of generality, i.e.,
We now prove that the reduction in the price of the bundle is profitable in each of the three regions X, Y , Z.
[Please put Figure First, regarding the region Z, it is straightforward to see that the reduction in the price of the bundle is profitable because it induces some types in Z to buy the bundle rather than buying nothing, or buying only object 1. Second, regarding the region X, notice that every type in this set buys at least object 2 under (p 1 , p 2 , P ). For any type buying object 2, the implicit price of object 1 is P − p 2 ; therefore a type in X buys also object 1 (i.e., buys the bundle) if and only if v 1 ≥ P − p 2 . Hence, for the types in X, the reduction in the price of the bundle has the effect of reducing the (implicit) price of object 1 and
Reducing the price of the bundle from P to P 0 has an effect on the types in Y (v 2 ) similar to the effect on the types in region X, but the profit increase from the types in Y (v 2 ) who buy the bundle under (p 1 , p 2 , P 0 ) but buy nothing under (p 1 , p 2 , P ) is P 0 , which is larger than P 0 − p 2 , the profit increase from the types in X who buy the bundle under (p 1 , p 2 , P 0 ) but buy only object 2 under (p 1 , p 2 , P ).
Formally, we find that
where each of the first, the second, the third terms refers, respectively, to region X, Y, Z.
< 0 since the third term term is strictly negative.
If we consider a mixed bundling schedule such that p 1 <v 1 , p 2 <v 2 , and p 2 + v 1 < P = p 1 + v 2 instead of p 2 + v 1 < p 1 + v 2 < P , we find again that a reduction in the price of the bundle is profitable because (i) region Z is empty in this case; (ii) in regions X and Y the previous arguments still apply (in the proof of Proposition 1 we take care of an extreme case in which ∂π ∂P = 0).
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We note that the optimal pure bundling price P * is larger than v 1 + v 2 , as is shown by Armstrong (1996) , even when J m 1 ≥ 0 and J m 2 ≥ 0 hold. In fact, if we let G and g denote the c.d.f. and the density of v 1 + v 2 , then g(v 1 + v 2 ) = 0. Therefore, under pure bundling, the virtual valuation for the bundle of a type with v 1 + v 2 close to v 1 + v 2 is negative, and
This implies that there always exists a positive measure of types who buy nothing in the optimal pure bundling schedule.
Remarks on non-negative virtual valuations Given the assumptions in Proposition 1, here we provide two remarks about distributions such that. J 
In words, a sufficiently large rightward shift makes positive the virtual valuation for object 1. An intuition for this result is immediate. First notice that
compares the gain from selling the object to a type with valuation x, which is xg 1 (x), with the loss from types with higher valuation, which is 1 − G 1 (x). Then we observe that after an ω-rightward shift in the distribution, the virtual valuation of a type ω + x (with
is non-negative if and only if
, that is if and only if
, which is definitely satisfied for a large ω. Essentially, an ω-rightward shift increases the gain from selling the object to any type without affecting the loss from types with higher valuation.
Second, in a certain sense it is simpler to satisfy the inequality J m 1 ≥ 0 if the density is decreasing than if it is increasing. Precisely, suppose that f 1 is increasing, and that J 
implies that P can be profitably reduced to p 2 +v 1 (hence μ 2 = 0), but not that P should be reduced to p 1 + v 2 . For instance, if (v 1 , v 2 ) is uniformly distributed over [6, 7] (v 1 +v 1 ). Letting
and
0, for a distribution with a density which is the mirror image of f 1 (and thus decreasing). This occurs since J 
≥ 0 for any consider the same model we have studied (allowing for correlated valuations). Their main result is that any independent pricing schedule (i.e., such that P = p 1 + p 2 ) is suboptimal under a suitable restriction on the distribution of v 1 , v 2 , which is always satisfied by independent distributions. But they do not study conditions under which pure bundling generates the highest profit. Precisely, let p * 1 , p * 2 denote the optimal prices under independent pricing. Then, they show that the schedule (p * .
General mechanisms
In Section 3 we have focused on the class of selling mechanisms such that M chooses a price schedule, which specifies a price for each object and a price for the bundle. However, if
we consider the set of all incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms, which we denote by M, then M includes many other mechanisms, and in particular stochastic mechanisms specifying that certain types of buyer receive an object with a probability in (0, 1). In this section we provide sufficient conditions for pure bundling to be the optimal selling mechanism among all mechanisms in M. We restrict attention to the case of i.i.d. 2 ) receives object 1 with probability q 1 (v 0 ), receives object 2 with probability q 2 (v 0 ), and pays T (v 0 ). The objective of M is to choose q and T in order to maximize the expectation of T (v) subject to participation and incentive constraints:
Although this is typically a complicated problem, the results in Pavlov (2011) give some insights on the optimal mechanism. First, since v 1 , v 2 are identically distributed, we can focus on determining the optimal q 1 , q 2 , T for (v 1 , v 2 ) such that v 2 ≥ v 1 ; symmetric results are obtained for v 2 < v 1 . Second, Pavlov (2011) shows that under the condition
it is optimal for M to restrict attention to mechanisms in which the buyer either gets no object, or gets her most preferred object for sure and her less preferred object with some probability. 14 Here, we are somewhat abusing notation by using again q 1 to denote a function defined on [v,v] , whereas q 1 which was introduced previously is defined on V . However, since only q 1 : [v,v] → [0, 1] is used from now on, there is no concern about ambiguity.
The profit of M from type v is t(
The expected profit is Zv
in which 1 − F (max{v 1 , −u(v 1 )}) takes into account that we are considering types satisfying 
. Therefore, u is increasing, and if
, and hence each type participates since we
The design problem is then reduced to maximizing (3) with respect to u(v) (within the set R) and with respect to q 1 (within the set of weakly increasing functions with domain [v,v] and codomain [0, 1] ). This is a one-dimensional screening problem in which the screening variable is the probability that the buyer receives her less preferred object, as a function of her reported valuation for that object. A non-standard feature is that for each type of buyer 
Then the optimal pure bundling price schedule is the optimal mechanism among all mechanisms in M.
, it follows that condition (4) can be interpreted as a strengthening of J m ≥ 0, which is more restrictive the greater is β. Conversely, (5) is less restrictive the greater is β, and it puts an upper bound on the probability mass in the left half interval of [v,v] . Inequality (5) is used in the proof of Proposition 3 to show that, although u(v) is smaller than −v, it is not too smaller than −v, and this helps to make pure bundling optimal.
It is immediate to see that if f is increasing and β = ; (iii) (5) holds since f increasing implies F convex, thus
. Hence, the following corollary holds. . Then the optimal pure bundling price schedule is the optimal mechanism among all mechanisms in M.
Notice that if (4) is satisfied for β ≥ 2, then (5) holds even though f is not increasing, but then (2) is not necessarily satisfied.
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Sufficient conditions for pure bundling to be the optimal mechanisms can be found also in 
Concluding remarks
We have given sufficient conditions for pure bundling to be the optimal mechanism, both for the case in which the seller's available instruments are restricted to price schedules, and for the case in which he can choose any incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism. It is interesting that unrelated conditions like those in Proposition 3, and those in Giannakopoulos (2014) and Hart and Nisan (2014) all imply that pure bundling is optimal.
An interesting question for future research is to know whether they are special cases of more general conditions under which pure bundling is optimal. Furthermore, little is known about the optimal mechanism to sell two (or more) objects when there are two (or more) buyers 15 The remark in Section 3 about large rightward shifts applies to satisfy (4) with β ≥ 2, but if the density's derivative is negative at some point, then (2) is violated for sufficiently large rightward shifts. 16 The result by Giannakopoulos (2014) holds also for the case of more than two objects.
which compete to buy the objects. Therefore it would be interesting to study whether the progress made for the setting with a single buyer helps to improve our understanding of the setting with multiple buyers. For instance, are there cases in which the optimal mechanism consists in auctioning the bundle of all the objects on sale?
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We fix an arbitrary mixed bundling schedule (p 1 , p 2 , P ) and prove that if J m 1 ≥ 0, J m 2 ≥ 0, then it is profitable for M to reduce the price of the bundle to min{p 1 + v 2 , p 2 + v 1 }, which means that M plays a pure bundling schedule; therefore no mixed bundling schedule maximizes π.
17 In order to fix the ideas, we consider p 1 , p 2 such that
Hence, (p 1 , p 2 , P ) is a pure bundling schedule if p 2 + v 1 = P , which implies that p 2 + v 1 < P needs to hold if (p 1 , p 2 , P ) is a mixed bundling schedule.
Step 1 in this proof proves that
Step 2 considers the case of p 2 + v 1 < P = p 1 + v 2 .
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Step 1 If J m 1 ≥ 0 and (p 1 , p 2 , P ) is a mixed bundling schedule such that p 1 + v 2 < P , then ∂π ∂P < 0. 
after rearranging we obtain
We know that
Although in several cases we prove that ∂π ∂P < 0, in one case it is conceivable that ∂π ∂P = 0, so that reducing the price of the bundle has no effect on M's profit. However, in this case we still prove that the optimal pure bundling schedule is superior to the initial mixed bundling schedule.
18 Given p 2 + v 1 ≤ p 1 + v 2 , the inequality J 19 We do not need to consider P < p 1 + v 2 since, as we explained in the main text, we assume without loss 
which is negative. ¥
Step 2 If J m 1 ≥ 0 and (p 1 , p 2 , P ) is a mixed bundling schedule such that p 2 + v 1 < P = p 1 + v 2 , then there exists a pure bundling schedule which yields a higher profit than (p 1 , p 2 , P ).
Proof of Step 2. Given
We can argue as in the proof of Step 1 to infer that each term in ∂π ∂P is negative or zero.
Moreover, notice that if p 2 > v 2 then ∂π ∂P < 0 because the second term in ∂π ∂P is equal to
negative. If conversely p 2 = v 2 , then it is possible that ∂π ∂P = 0 and that decreasing the price of the bundle until v 1 + v 2 has no effect on π. In such a case, the profit under the initial mixed bundling schedule coincides with v 1 + v 2 , but we know that the optimal pure bundling schedule yields a profit higher than v 1 + v 2 , and thus higher than the profit under the initial mixed bundling schedule. Therefore, even in this case we can find a pure bundling schedule which is superior to the initial mixed bundling schedule. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2
Using the symmetry in the distributions and
, and π = 2pμ 1 + P μ 12 . Therefore
In order for (p, P ) to be a mixed bundling schedule it is necessary that p <v and P − p > v.
Hence the first term in ∂π ∂P is negative since 1−F (p) > 0, and
which is satisfied since v + J m ≥ 0.
6.3 The case of P > p 1 + p 2
In the case of P > p 1 + p 2 , we assume that the seller can monitor the buyer's purchase such that when she buys both objects she must pay P . This assumption is not needed to be explicitly made when P ≤ p 1 + p 2 since the buyer prefers paying P to paying p 1 + p 2 when she buys both objects.
For price schedules such that P > p 1 + p 2 , we can argue as in Section 3 to find that a buyer of type (v 1 , v 2 ) buys only object 1 if and only if
buys only object 2 if and only if v 2 ≥ p 2 , v 1 < P − p 2 , v 2 ≥ p 2 − p 1 + v 1 ; buys the bundle if and only if v 1 ≥ P − p 2 , v 2 ≥ P − p 1 . Moreover, without loss of generality we can restrict
20 As in Section 3. 21 If P − p 1 >v 2 (or P − p 2 >v 1 ), then μ 12 = 0 because each type prefers buying only object 1 (only object 2) to buying the bundle. However, the profit remains unchanged if M reduces the price of the bundle to satisfy P = min{p 1 +v 2 , p 2 +v 1 }.
and 
We can argue as in the proof of Proposition 1 to conclude that each term in 
, which is negative unless P − p 1 =v 2 .
In the case that P = p 2 +v 1 = p 1 +v 2 , we have that
< 0 for P slightly smaller than p 2 +v 1 = p 1 +v 2 . This makes reducing P strictly profitable.
In the case that v 1 , v 2 are i.i.d., we have
By the virtue of the same argument used in the proof of Proposition 2, v + J m ≥ 0 implies that 1 −F (P − p) −2(P −p)f(P −p) < 0, and thus
= 0 for P = p +v, but ∂Π ∂P < 0 for P slightly smaller than p +v.
Proof of Proposition 3
It is convenient to define
function. We use π(γ, q 1 ) to denote the profit of M in (3) as a function of (γ, q 1 ) and prove that π is maximized with respect to q 1 at q 1 = q The proof is split in three steps. The first two steps establish that M can restrict his attention to values of γ in the interval [v,v] . The third step proves that the optimal γ is relatively close to v, and this implies that the optimal q 1 is q pb 1 .
Step 1: It is suboptimal to choose γ < v which is increasing with respect to γ. Therefore no γ smaller than v is optimal.
Step 2: Given (γ, q 1 ) such that γ >v, there existsq 1 such that π(v,q 1 ) = π(γ, q 1 ) .
First notice that if
The equality π(v,q 1 ) = π(γ, q 1 ) holds because the set of participating types and the payment of each participating type are the same in the two cases.
Step 3: If (4) and (5) are satisfied for some β > 1, then π is maximized at
The proof of this step is split in three substeps. First we define a functionπ(γ, q 1 ) such that π(γ, q 1 ) ≤π(γ, q 1 ) and π(γ, q pb 1 ) =π(γ, q pb 1 ), and then we prove thatπ is maximized with respect to q 1 at q 1 = q pb 1 . Since π(γ, q 1 ) ≤π(γ, q 1 ) and π(γ, q pb 1 ) =π(γ, q pb 1 ), it follows that also π is maximized with respect to q 1 at q 1 = q pb 1 .
Step 3.1: The definition ofπ(γ, q 1 ) In view of Steps 1-2, we assume that γ belongs to Step 3.2: If (4) is satisfied for some β > 1 and 1 − 
